As luck would have it, less than two days after I posted part four, I got into a fierce discussion with Trent about the nature of morality. I realized that my previous post was inadequate with respect to certain issues. Trent also convinced me of the necessity of modifying my position somewhat. So, part 5 will have to wait, as I attempt to address a few key issues on my ethical philosophy.
Firstly, I must reemphasize that I believe that this moral rationale applies only in the case of a purposeless universe. I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to be certain (or even fairly confident) whether or not humanity/life has an underlying purpose driving its existence, and I therefore believe it is prudent to give consideration to either eventuality. In fact, as I have previously stated, my beliefs lean slightly toward a purposeful existence of one kind or another.
The second thing I must address is my own ignorance. As I have little practical training in philosophy, I have come to realize that some of the terminology I have been using is inaccurate or incomplete from a philosophical standpoint. For example, I use the term "moral relativism" in a broader sense than the specific usage in modern philosophy. When I discuss "moral relativism" I simply mean a rejection of the metaphysical thesis (the truth of a moral statement is based on objective moral facts,which are mind-independent just like non-moral facts) but an affirmation of the semantic thesis (moral statements express propositions) and acceptance of the aletic thesis (some moral propositions are in some way true). I do not mean "cultural relativism".
The other place where I feel I have been ignorant is on the distinctions between the different branches of ethics, as defined in modern philosophy. I believe my previous post can be confusing because it does not distinguish between my meta-ethical position and my normative position.
Based on what I have read, my meta-ethical position is certainly cognitivist, but likely anti-realist. From what I have read, I believe it is a form of what wikipedia calls "Individualist Ethical Subjectivism". Basically this is a fancy way of saying what I noted in my last post, which is that each individual has a unique moral framework, based on their genetics and experiences. All of these individual views are equally valid and equally "right", with two exceptions:
1. The individual's moral framework is not internally consistent or not rational. Any valid individual morality must be reasonably consistent and rational. I understand that the vast majority of people (including me) have not examined their own beliefs closely enough to be sure that no inconsistencies exist, but I believe a person who has a very well-thought-out framework can safely say that their moral framework is more valid than someone whose morality is riddled with inconsistency. I admit there is a subjective dividing line here.
2. The moral framework is based on an incorrect understanding of mind-independent facts. This, I believe, is where moral progress comes from. I believe the moral framework of the average person today can be said to be more valid than that of a person from the past simply because we have greater general knowledge. Human sacrifice, for example, was born out of an incorrect knowledge of nature. The Aztecs genuinely thought that human sacrifice was fundamental to ensuring the survival of their society, and thus moral. We now know that to be an empirical falsehood; many societies have been very successful without human sacrifice. I therefore think that we have some justification to say that our morality is more "right" than theirs. I also think that it is very likely that future humans, with a better understanding of the universe, will have some justification in claiming to be morally superior to us.
As for my normative position, I think the closest philosophical position to mine is something called Preference Utilitarianism, which basically says the moral action is the one that leads to the greatest "good," where "good" is defined as the satisfaction of each person's (presumably each stakeholder's) individual preferences or desires. This is close to what I talk about in my previous post, with a couple important differences. It seems that a situation could arise where someone could do something contrary to their own preferences or desires, because they consider it moral.
For example, take the case of stealing. I would imagine there are cases where stealing would greatly satisfy the "preferences and desires" of the thief, and would not substantially damage the "preferences and desires" of any other stakeholder. Under Preference Utilitarianism, it would seem like the moral action would be to steal the item. However, in my normative view, that stealing is unlikely to be morally non-zero sum (unless both the thief and the victim consider stealing to be morally acceptable) and would certainly violate the freely established moral consensus of Canada, where stealing is held to be wrong in most cases.
The second difference is the inclusion of non-zero sumness itself. I believe that win-wins are inherently better than win-lose scenarios. Consider the difference between two choices in a moral dilemma with two stakeholders. In Choice A, the outcome is morally satisfactory to both stakeholders, but results in a net change in "preferences or desires" of say, 10 on a hypothetical numeric scale. In Choice B, the individual morality of one stakeholder is satisfied, but that of the other is not (the action is immoral to them). However, this scenario results in a net change of 20 on our hypothetical scale. The Preference Utilitarian and I would come to different conclusions.
Having (hopefully) fleshed out some of my ideas and been more clear about the philosophical positions I hold, I'd like to end with my answers or thoughts about some of the specific questions that came up in my debate with Trent. I don't pretend that there won't be inconsistiencies, and I certainly don't have all the answers. However, I feel obligated to do my best.
1. Moral Wikiality
There is something troubling about morality set by consensus. What about a society consisting entirely of child abusers? If the freely established moral consensus is that this is acceptable, does that make it right in the context of that society? How does this reconcile with observed feelings that that would be wrong in any scenario?
Here I think the answer comes from our good friend evolution. Basically, my argument for why Moral Wikiality is not a big problem is also the key distinction between my meta-ethical view and what is commonly referred to as cultural relativism. This is my belief that our individual moral frameworks have a genetic component. Individuals with strong negative feelings toward certain actions would find it much easier to survive and reproduce as a member of a social species. Humans with a strong aversion to murdering each other would certainly be able to work together more effectivley, and increase their survival rate.
Once humans developed agriculture and started forming larger-scale societies that frequently interacted with each other, further reinforcement of "moral universals" came from society as well as from genetics. Societal "evolution" began to reinforce cooperative behaviour, as societies that had greater cooperation, greater non-zero sumness, began to conquer and replace weaker neighbouring societies. Cultures that conditioned their children against dysfunctional behaviour like incest, child abuse and irrational violence survived, and those behaviours were strongly reinforced.
So, I believe that both genetics and cultural development have endowed humans with strong, and basically universal, opposition to certain behaviours. The society of child abusers and the society of murderers could never exist. Even societies with slaves are quickly fading, as they are outcompeted by those societies with more efficient economic frameworks.
One note, is that I do not believe that this combination of genetic and societal selection will eventually result in one perfect "universal" morality. There are plenty of moral issues that do not have a clear effect on the survival of individuals or societies. Take for example euthenasia. It is here that the most contentious issues will be found, and this is where different societies will have different approaches that must be respected.
2. What constitutes a moral action?
In a society governed by the rules I have set out in part four, how does someone know what constitutes a moral action? If the society is not free, or otherwise not representative of the true moral consensus, what guides people's actions? Is any action that conforms to the consensus & one's personal morality moral? What about the instance where people are mistaken about the consensus?
The short answer is that you never know for certain what the moral action is, you can only make your best guess. This is why freedom and strong moral discourse in a society are so key, because it improves the ability to make educated guesses. I have to think more on some of the specific scenarios above, especially in the case of people making the wrong guess. I think it is also important to reemphasize that the moral action is ideally the most non-zero sum outcome for all the stakeholders, and that the societal consensus acts (in the ideal society) as an approximation of the views of the average citizen, and as a constraining force.
Taking an action contrary to a false consensus in an unfree society is certainly not immoral in itself. Even taking action contrary to the consensus in a free society may be moral, in some cases.
3. Relations between societies
The layout of my position largely governs moral relations within a society. What about moral relations between societies? Does moral relativism imply non-interventionism? Do we have the right (or the obligation) to morally condemn actions taken in other societies that we see as immoral?
Easy answers here. My views do not imply non-interventionism at all. In fact, it may suggest the opposite in some cases.
We have the right to critique the morals of other societies, although this does not imply they are absolutely "wrong," in a mind-independent way. It simply adds to the moral discourse within both societies, and should be beneficial for that reason alone. One just must be careful to avoid "moral superiority" and fundamentalism. Both societies will benefit if they listen to what the other has to say.
4. Definition of a society
If we say that morality is based at least in part on the freely established consensus of a society, how do we define a society? Can it be argued that every society has sub-societies, and that it is therefore impossible to define the level at which a moral consensus might be established?
This argument has a point, but I think that it is logical to define a society as the broadest group that subscribes to the same "social contract" (basically the same laws and institutions). In the vast majority of cases this is the level of the state. I don't have a well-thought-through argument for why this should be the case, however.
5. Moral Progress
Are we justified in saying we are morally superior to older societies in which practices we find morally objectionable (like slavery or human sacrifice)? If so, how does this reconcile with a relativistic morality?
See Above.
6. Nature vs. Nurture and Moral Universals
Why are there certain moral rules that seem to be ubiquitous among almost all societies throughout history? Doesn't this provide evidence for moral universals?
See #1.
Hope that clears some things up. It has for me I think.
