Four Point Five

As luck would have it, less than two days after I posted part four, I got into a fierce discussion with Trent about the nature of morality. I realized that my previous post was inadequate with respect to certain issues. Trent also convinced me of the necessity of modifying my position somewhat. So, part 5 will have to wait, as I attempt to address a few key issues on my ethical philosophy.

Firstly, I must reemphasize that I believe that this moral rationale applies only in the case of a purposeless universe. I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to be certain (or even fairly confident) whether or not humanity/life has an underlying purpose driving its existence, and I therefore believe it is prudent to give consideration to either eventuality. In fact, as I have previously stated, my beliefs lean slightly toward a purposeful existence of one kind or another.

The second thing I must address is my own ignorance. As I have little practical training in philosophy, I have come to realize that some of the terminology I have been using is inaccurate or incomplete from a philosophical standpoint. For example, I use the term "moral relativism" in a broader sense than the specific usage in modern philosophy. When I discuss "moral relativism" I simply mean a rejection of the metaphysical thesis (the truth of a moral statement is based on objective moral facts,which are mind-independent just like non-moral facts) but an affirmation of the semantic thesis (moral statements express propositions) and acceptance of the aletic thesis (some moral propositions are in some way true). I do not mean "cultural relativism".

The other place where I feel I have been ignorant is on the distinctions between the different branches of ethics, as defined in modern philosophy. I believe my previous post can be confusing because it does not distinguish between my meta-ethical position and my normative position.

Based on what I have read, my meta-ethical position is certainly cognitivist, but likely anti-realist. From what I have read, I believe it is a form of what wikipedia calls "Individualist Ethical Subjectivism". Basically this is a fancy way of saying what I noted in my last post, which is that each individual has a unique moral framework, based on their genetics and experiences. All of these individual views are equally valid and equally "right", with two exceptions:

1. The individual's moral framework is not internally consistent or not rational. Any valid individual morality must be reasonably consistent and rational. I understand that the vast majority of people (including me) have not examined their own beliefs closely enough to be sure that no inconsistencies exist, but I believe a person who has a very well-thought-out framework can safely say that their moral framework is more valid than someone whose morality is riddled with inconsistency. I admit there is a subjective dividing line here.

2. The moral framework is based on an incorrect understanding of mind-independent facts. This, I believe, is where moral progress comes from. I believe the moral framework of the average person today can be said to be more valid than that of a person from the past simply because we have greater general knowledge. Human sacrifice, for example, was born out of an incorrect knowledge of nature. The Aztecs genuinely thought that human sacrifice was fundamental to ensuring the survival of their society, and thus moral. We now know that to be an empirical falsehood; many societies have been very successful without human sacrifice. I therefore think that we have some justification to say that our morality is more "right" than theirs. I also think that it is very likely that future humans, with a better understanding of the universe, will have some justification in claiming to be morally superior to us.

As for my normative position, I think the closest philosophical position to mine is something called Preference Utilitarianism, which basically says the moral action is the one that leads to the greatest "good," where "good" is defined as the satisfaction of each person's (presumably each stakeholder's) individual preferences or desires. This is close to what I talk about in my previous post, with a couple important differences. It seems that a situation could arise where someone could do something contrary to their own preferences or desires, because they consider it moral.

For example, take the case of stealing. I would imagine there are cases where stealing would greatly satisfy the "preferences and desires" of the thief, and would not substantially damage the "preferences and desires" of any other stakeholder. Under Preference Utilitarianism, it would seem like the moral action would be to steal the item. However, in my normative view, that stealing is unlikely to be morally non-zero sum (unless both the thief and the victim consider stealing to be morally acceptable) and would certainly violate the freely established moral consensus of Canada, where stealing is held to be wrong in most cases.

The second difference is the inclusion of non-zero sumness itself. I believe that win-wins are inherently better than win-lose scenarios. Consider the difference between two choices in a moral dilemma with two stakeholders. In Choice A, the outcome is morally satisfactory to both stakeholders, but results in a net change in "preferences or desires" of say, 10 on a hypothetical numeric scale. In Choice B, the individual morality of one stakeholder is satisfied, but that of the other is not (the action is immoral to them). However, this scenario results in a net change of 20 on our hypothetical scale. The Preference Utilitarian and I would come to different conclusions.

Having (hopefully) fleshed out some of my ideas and been more clear about the philosophical positions I hold, I'd like to end with my answers or thoughts about some of the specific questions that came up in my debate with Trent. I don't pretend that there won't be inconsistiencies, and I certainly don't have all the answers. However, I feel obligated to do my best.

1. Moral Wikiality

There is something troubling about morality set by consensus. What about a society consisting entirely of child abusers? If the freely established moral consensus is that this is acceptable, does that make it right in the context of that society? How does this reconcile with observed feelings that that would be wrong in any scenario?

Here I think the answer comes from our good friend evolution. Basically, my argument for why Moral Wikiality is not a big problem is also the key distinction between my meta-ethical view and what is commonly referred to as cultural relativism. This is my belief that our individual moral frameworks have a genetic component. Individuals with strong negative feelings toward certain actions would find it much easier to survive and reproduce as a member of a social species. Humans with a strong aversion to murdering each other would certainly be able to work together more effectivley, and increase their survival rate.

Once humans developed agriculture and started forming larger-scale societies that frequently interacted with each other, further reinforcement of "moral universals" came from society as well as from genetics. Societal "evolution" began to reinforce cooperative behaviour, as societies that had greater cooperation, greater non-zero sumness, began to conquer and replace weaker neighbouring societies. Cultures that conditioned their children against dysfunctional behaviour like incest, child abuse and irrational violence survived, and those behaviours were strongly reinforced.

So, I believe that both genetics and cultural development have endowed humans with strong, and basically universal, opposition to certain behaviours. The society of child abusers and the society of murderers could never exist. Even societies with slaves are quickly fading, as they are outcompeted by those societies with more efficient economic frameworks.

One note, is that I do not believe that this combination of genetic and societal selection will eventually result in one perfect "universal" morality. There are plenty of moral issues that do not have a clear effect on the survival of individuals or societies. Take for example euthenasia. It is here that the most contentious issues will be found, and this is where different societies will have different approaches that must be respected.

2. What constitutes a moral action?

In a society governed by the rules I have set out in part four, how does someone know what constitutes a moral action? If the society is not free, or otherwise not representative of the true moral consensus, what guides people's actions? Is any action that conforms to the consensus & one's personal morality moral? What about the instance where people are mistaken about the consensus?

The short answer is that you never know for certain what the moral action is, you can only make your best guess. This is why freedom and strong moral discourse in a society are so key, because it improves the ability to make educated guesses. I have to think more on some of the specific scenarios above, especially in the case of people making the wrong guess. I think it is also important to reemphasize that the moral action is ideally the most non-zero sum outcome for all the stakeholders, and that the societal consensus acts (in the ideal society) as an approximation of the views of the average citizen, and as a constraining force.

Taking an action contrary to a false consensus in an unfree society is certainly not immoral in itself. Even taking action contrary to the consensus in a free society may be moral, in some cases.

3. Relations between societies

The layout of my position largely governs moral relations within a society. What about moral relations between societies? Does moral relativism imply non-interventionism? Do we have the right (or the obligation) to morally condemn actions taken in other societies that we see as immoral?

Easy answers here. My views do not imply non-interventionism at all. In fact, it may suggest the opposite in some cases.

We have the right to critique the morals of other societies, although this does not imply they are absolutely "wrong," in a mind-independent way. It simply adds to the moral discourse within both societies, and should be beneficial for that reason alone. One just must be careful to avoid "moral superiority" and fundamentalism. Both societies will benefit if they listen to what the other has to say.

4. Definition of a society

If we say that morality is based at least in part on the freely established consensus of a society, how do we define a society? Can it be argued that every society has sub-societies, and that it is therefore impossible to define the level at which a moral consensus might be established?

This argument has a point, but I think that it is logical to define a society as the broadest group that subscribes to the same "social contract" (basically the same laws and institutions). In the vast majority of cases this is the level of the state. I don't have a well-thought-through argument for why this should be the case, however.

5. Moral Progress

Are we justified in saying we are morally superior to older societies in which practices we find morally objectionable (like slavery or human sacrifice)? If so, how does this reconcile with a relativistic morality?

See Above.

6. Nature vs. Nurture and Moral Universals

Why are there certain moral rules that seem to be ubiquitous among almost all societies throughout history? Doesn't this provide evidence for moral universals?

See #1.

Hope that clears some things up. It has for me I think.

The Economist's Tale (4 of 5)

Say that we decide the assumptions of the prophet are erroneous, and instead decide to accept the opposing set of theories. We are then left with two choices:

1. A concurrent multiverse, encompassing a vast number of universes with different & random physical laws.

2. An underlying unity in physics that mandates the values of the parameters and physical laws that we observe.

These views suggest, in opposition to the others, that life, and consciousness, are simply an accident of the universe, generated in the same way as any of the other complex phenomena that we observe. There is no meaning to our existence, no purpose for us to fulfill, and little room for the existence of God.

If we accept that this is the case, then the next question logically becomes this: If we have no purpose to fulfill, how can we decide how to conduct our existence?

If we are committed to acting in a rational and consistent way, there are three schools of thought as to the actions people should take.

1. Consequentialism- People should act based on how the consequences of an act conform to some principle or goal

2. Deontology- People should act based on how the nature of the act itself conforms to some principle

3. Virtue Ethics- People should act based on how the action affects the actor in relation to some principle or goal, usually either fulfillment of potential or relevance to the actor's comparative advantages

Within each of these categories, there are many, many options. Take consequentialism, for example. Philosophers have struggled to identify a goal for consequentialists to pursue, or even a concise set of goals. Happiness, wealth, survival or power for oneself have all been suggested.

Also proposed have been a number of societal goals, rather than individual ones. For example, one might strive to maximize the happiness of society, rather than his own happiness.The question that provides the key to this whole mess, however, often gets lost in the shuffle. One should start by asking whether it is reasonable to assume that there is an overriding ethical principle or set of principles. Is it reasonable to assume there is a single, defined way that people should behave?

I would answer in the negative for the following reasons:

1. People have different ideas about what the ideal world looks like. I think that an ethical view necessarily implies a view of the ideal world. For example, a consequentialist that believes in maximization of personal happiness implies that he believes his ideal world to be one where he is always happy. In contrast, a collectivist virtue ethicist would implicitly have an ideal world where everyone reached their full potential. Since it is quite obvious that different people have different ideas about the ideal state of the world, I think it is unreasonable to assume that they should have the same ethical view.

2. There is no evidence to show there is any one set of universal moral standards. People often say that religion provides this universality, but any cursory examination of religion (especially Abrahamic religion) shows the "universal" moral code to either be treated extremely selectively according to the culture of the time period (as in mainstream Christianity) or be extremely deviant from mainstream beliefs (as in fundamentalist Christianity).

3. The fact that after at least 2500 years of scholarly debate, we are still no closer to any sort of consensus than we were in the days of Socrates, probably means that there is no universal morality to discover. Unlike the advancement of science (say development of a theory of quantum gravity), a universal moral code does not seem likely to emerge with more or better information, due to the nature of moral questions as opposed to scientific ones. On a practical note, even if such consensus were possible among philosophers, it would be next to impossible to get all people to adopt it as their personal moral code.

The questions that I anticipate people will ask of this line of reasoning are as follows: if there are no moral universals, how should we decide how to live our lives? How can we be sure that our laws are just? How can we incorporate billions of people, all with different moral standards, into a coherent and fair society?

Here I believe the answer is best illustrated through an analogy with economics. Just as everyone (I believe) has a distinct moral code, based on our genetics and experiences, individuals have a unique set of consumption preferences in economics. All of these individual consumption preferences (or utility curves, if you like) are aggregated together to form the demand side of economics. Just because my individual price preferences are different that someone else's doesn't mean we can't have a fair economic system that represents the consumption preferences of all people.

In the same way, I believe that a society defines its collective morals through the aggregation of the individual moral views of all the citizens. The vast majority of individual people have value systems that postulate random murder of innocent people as immoral, just as the vast majority of people in our society have consumption preferences where they would not pay $1000 for a grapefruit. Now, certainly there are people that might pay $5 for a grapefruit, and that influences the overall price of grapefruits in the economy. Other people might only pay 10 cents for a grapefruit, say if they happen not to like them. These divergent views do not suggest that the market price of a grapefruit in our society is in any way unfair, in fact (in a truly free market), it should be the fairest possible price given all relevant views.

Now take the subject of the morality of killing. There are people in our society who believe that all killing of living things is immoral, and attempt to do as little of it as possible. There are also people (serial killers and the like) who see no moral quandary in killing any life (human or otherwise) for their own pleasure. Most of us fall somewhere in the middle, where we might happily kill plants and insects, and don't necessarily mind the humane killing of lower animals either for food (like cows) or for other reasons (like rats), but we have profound doubts about the needless slaughter of higher animals like dolphins and apes, and we have to think long and hard on our views about any kind of human killing, even if there are complicating factors (see abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty and even self-defense).

Not only are people in our society spread across a wide spectrum when it comes to killing, but that spectrum has an even larger standard deviation if you look back through time. There were periods of history (many!) where the wholesale slaughter of other humans was largely accepted by the most advanced societies of the time.

We cannot be so presumptuous as to think that no person is ever morally justified to kill another, nor can we say that abortion is wrong in all circumstances, always has been, and will be forever (deontological views). We cannot even say that murdering one hundred innocent people to save a thousand is always right (a consequentialist view). We can only say that there are many differing opinions on many moral issues, and that we must try to have a society that is just and fair nonetheless. The only way I see to do this is to treat morality as a relative thing, and common morality as an aggregation of the individual morality of all the members of a society.

The question then remains, how does a person conduct themselves in order to make such a morally relative society as just and fair as possible? People take comfort in absolutes, and it is pleasant to many people to believe that if they just follow a few simple ethical rules, everything will work itself out. We have seen that there is no silver bullet in that sense, no absolute truths that if followed, will always result in a utopian outcome, but there are a few things that people can take to heart and even consider to be guiding principles in a morally relativistic world.

1. People need to try their best to accept and manage diverging views. In a morally relativistic society, one of the greatest dangers is fundamentalism of any kind. If people don't realize that different moral opinions may also be valid, that is the first step toward intolerance. Steadfast attempts to prove the moral superiority of one view, or attempts to force others to change their morals to match one's own, can only lead to conflict. All people, regardless of their moral views, should preach acceptance and understanding of the moral views of others, and respect for honest differences of opinion.

2. My second principle is related to the first, and must be considered in tandem with it. Realizing that everyone has a different set of moral views is good, but we must also realize that individuals' moral frameworks are constantly being "tweaked," and may even be significantly altered through experiences, discussions and debates. Discussion and debate on moral issues is also extremely critical for establishing and maintaining a just and fair moral consensus within a society, which I will refer to as a "moral zeitgeist".

Just as it is very difficult to establish a fair price for goods and services in a command economy or any other economy where there is insufficient consumer information, it is difficult if not impossible to have a truly just society when there is not sufficient freedom to allow the creation of a moral zeitgeist that is representative of the views of all members of the society.

Although I dislike the idea of having an exception to principle #1, I am forced to conclude that in the scenario where there is moral opposition to free and open discourse (and not just political and social opposition by the elite/men), we should nonetheless be obligated to intervene, and do all in our power to promote freedom of discourse (which encompasses freedom of speech, thought, religion, assembly and freedom of the press). I believe this is essentially analogous to the need for antitrust laws in a free economic system, that is, necessary to preserve the integrity of the system itself.

I must add a disclaimer here, because the preceding paragraph could be interpreted as condoning violent action toward any unfree state, and could also imply that I believe the absence of freedom is the only justifiable reason for international military action. Neither is true. To the first assertion, I would respond that military action is not the only way to influence the expansion of freedom in a society, and should in fact be a last resort (see my post The Altar of Freedom). On the latter question, I believe that the moral zeitgeist in a society can provide other justifiable reasons for military action (such as the strong beliefs against genocide in the zeitgeist of western nations). I am only saying that all free nations have a serious obligation to advance freedom around the world.

In those societies where that freedom does exist, the most fair moral zeitgeist will come when people are engaged and active in society. People should endeavour to discuss their moral views as much as possible, and seek out different views and perspectives in order to refine their own morality. Challenging the views of others and advocating one's own beliefs (in a way consistent with principle #1) should be encouraged, as the resulting debate will be inherently valuable to both parties as well as to the society.

3. The third thing that people need to consider in a morally relativistic world is that they have only partial control over the moral zeitgeist of their society, and that even if an individual view conflicts with that consensus, there must be an understanding that it is a consensus. Just as all people must pay the market price for goods, or live with the consequences of doing otherwise, those people who choose to act against the established morals of their society must face a different set of consequences. One of the attacks most often levelled against moral relativism is that we have no right to apply consequences in such a world. I strongly disagree, and believe that it essentially does not matter whether a given action is always wrong, if it is wrong according to the freely established consensus of a society, the perpetrator must live with the consequences of his/her violation.

4. The fourth and final principle I would advocate is similar to one I have previously advocated on an economic and social basis. I have previously argued in favour of Robert Wright's nonzero hypothesis, which argues that societies compete and evolve based on their level of nonzero-sum interactions. The most successful societies, he argues, are those that have the highest proportion of non-zero sum interaction.

I would take the same argument and apply it to systems of moral interaction. In a morally relativistic world, the most successful moral systems are going to be those that are morally nonzero-sum. What I mean by this is that people facing moral dilemmas in any society are often going to have a number of (personally) morally acceptable choices. Especially in situations where a moral dilemma involves others, the nonzero hypothesis would advocate taking into account not only one's own morality, but the morality of other stakeholders (or your best guesses about their morality, based on personal experience and knowledge of the prevailing zeitgeist). The best choice would be the one that satisfies your individual morality, and also creates the largest number of moral win-win scenarios.

How do we do this? How do we create tolerance and understanding, while at the same time vigorously promote debate and discussion? How do we decide what consequences are appropriate for those that do not accept the moral consensus? How do we promote nonzero-summness? The answers to the former questions lies in Wright's answer to the latter.

Wright shows in detail that increases in non-zero sum interaction are based on two things, communication and trust. I will leave that particular explanation in his capable hands, but I will expand it to cover my other proposals.In terms of promoting tolerance and understanding, both communication and trust are vitally important.

Improved communication allows people to discover far more information about other people who may be geographically or culturally different, and to obtain far more information about various moral theories and systems.

Trust helps people let down their guard and discover things that may be unfamiliar to them. Trust that other people are going to be reasonable and accepting of different views also promotes mutual understanding and exchange. Both communication and trust help people see others as "someone like me" rather than the proverbial "other", which is something Wright discusses extensively in his book.

The advantages of communication and trust in promoting open debate and enabling gradual changes to the moral zeitgeist are self evident and cannot be overstated. Establishing fair consequences and making sure everyone understands those conseqences is also vastly easier in a communicating, trusting, nonzero-sum world.

Now I believe we have established a pragmatic and intelligent ethical system in the case where humanity is an accident of the universe, the next question lies in reconciling it with the conclusions reached in the Prophet's Tale, and combining the two worldviews into a philosophical foundation from which to justify my empirical beliefs. That daunting task awaits in the final post of the series...