The Architect's Tale (5 of 5)

In the previous five posts, I have explored and fleshed out my ideas on many philosophical ideas. I believe I have constructed a rational set of conclusions that reflect the best knowledge I have about the universe, and that these ideas can be built on further in this post.

The main conclusions I have reached so far are:

1. It is logical to assume the universe exists largely as I observe it.

2. The explanations for why the universe is the way it is can be split into two groups, those postulating some purpose for life, and those that do not. Either group could contain the correct answer, I believe the purposeful existence to be slightly more likely.

3. There are several guiding principles that people should use to decide how to live their lives. They include:

- People should act to ensure the survival of intelligent life by any necessary means

- People should endeavour to discover a possible purpose to our existence through study, observation and exploration of the universe. They should also use this increased knowledge to refine their moral views

- People should promote the establishment of free societies wherever they do not already exist, and encourage as much discussion and debate as they can within their own societies

- People should recognize the validity of a variety of viewpoints, and avoid fundamentalism and self-righteousness

-People should try to make sure that their decisions, moral and otherwise, are as nonzero-sum as possible, and should promote increased nonzero-sumness within their societies (and between societies) by increasing communication and trust

I think that those statements are a pretty good foundation for my belief system. However, to complete the circle, and build those core statements up towards my political beliefs, more work is needed.

Firstly, I would argue that in order to increase communication and trust, and in order to facilitate free discourse and the study and exploration of the universe, some kind of society is necessary. Anarchism will not work here, because it has at its base a rejection of the type of cooperation necessary for things like global communication networks and large-scale space exploration.

The next thing to consider is the kind of society that should be constructed, beyond the simple requirement of free discourse. Again, the requirements above dictate a technological society, one that accepts and promotes rational thought, questioning of paradigms and allows for new ideas. In my mind, this eliminates the forms of societies that discourage free thought, promote blind acceptance of ideas and discourage deviation.

This disqualifies any totalitarian state, be it fascist or communist, and also disqualifies any theocracy of the kind prevalent today. I do not deny, however, that it would be possible (although probably not with Christianity or Islam), to have an open and accepting theocracy that was in harmony with science and free discourse. This would require a more nuanced interpretation of God than is found in most western religions today, although many of the eastern religions seem to mesh relatively well with a scientific worldview. For now, however, I am of the strong opinion that the principles I have outlined can be accomplished most fully thorough a vigorously defended separation of church and state.

The next point I want to make is that any large-scale, technological and rational society must have some notion of personal responsibility. The evidence for this is empirical, there has been no successful society that has not been based on personal responsibility. This implies a key philosophical assumption, the one that started my whole philosophical investigation. The notion of personal responsibility is absurd without free will. If someone is not in control of their actions, there is no logical reason to punish or reward them for those actions. Therefore, I believe that we must accept the existence of free will. Even if there is no free will, we must continue to believe, and act, as if there is. Right now, I believe there is no conclusive evidence either way, but even if there was, I think we would, in order to have a chance of succeeding as a species, would have to ignore it. This pains me greatly, but I see no other way.

Once we accept that we have free will, I believe the notion of differential reward systems becomes defensible. If people can make free choices, then people can expect different standards of living, within an acceptable range. It is perfectly acceptable for people that perform certain actions, like hard work, to be rewarded to a greater extent than those that do not.

The following question then becomes, what types of actions should qualify a person for such a differential reward? This question is at the foundation of the type of economic system that I support. I believe that the ultimate measuring stick for differential reward should be "contribution to society". A person who makes a society more dynamic and vibrant, or achieves some great advance in understanding, should be rewarded more than someone who contributes nothing. However, it is obviously extremely difficult to build an economic system based on contribution, because there will never be complete agreement on what contributions are most important.

A second factor that is important to consider when discussing an ideal economic system is efficiency. In order to promote the development of a society, especially from a technical/scientific point of view, economic resources must be allocated as efficiently as possible. Inefficient societies will either be replaced my more efficient ones, or simply stagnate or crawl along at a snail's pace.

My view of the empirical evidence is that capitalism, tempered by government management of externalities, tends to be the best system to satisfy those dual criteria of efficiency and reward for contribution. Although the use of a price system and monetary reward has its issues, it is by far the most efficient system we have yet tried, and has produced massive technological advancement, and for the first time, a potential capability to explore the universe and to begin to reduce existential threats to humanity's existence.

In my view, there are three big problems with capitalism that do not naturally coincide with my perceived ultimate goals. The first is one have discussed previously, the existence of externalities in a capitalist economic system. I have previously advocated that management of this problem should be the primary responsibility of the government.

The second, related issue is that of equality of opportunity. If we are to have a system truly based on differential reward, it is essential that everyone have the same opportunity to succeed, otherwise the system will lose both efficiency and fairness. Some of this issue will be addressed by the management of externalities, for example, education and health care are both underproduced by a competitive market, given the positive externalities they create. Government will indirectly promote equality of opportunity by addressing these issues. However, I believe there is more that would need to be done. Even with management of externalities, issues like a de facto "aristocracy" based on inherited wealth (and the opposite, children disadvantaged by the socio-economic performance of their parents) as well as issues of broad-based discrimination might need to be addressed.

The third, and biggest issue, is the difference between contribution and profit. Capitalist systems encourage the maximization of the latter, as we all know. However, I believe empirical evidence clearly shows that although profit-making and contribution are correlated (strongly so), there remains a significant gap. I believe that it is self evident that many people grow rich without contribution, and many contributors live in poverty.

Exactly who these people are is certainly debatable, but I would give my own opinion that it tends to be artists of various kinds and scientists who are under-rewarded in our system and that celebrities of various kinds as well as many people in my own field (finance) and other service industries who are often overvalued. Now it is important to note that finance professionals, lawyers and other service professionals do make significant contributions to the functioning of societies and deserve to be rewarded. I am only stating that I believe it to be excessive in some cases.

Policies that can fix this problem are few and far between. As hard as I try, I cannot find many ways to try and reconcile this difference between contribution and wealth. This, in my view, should be one of the foremost challenges of the 21st century. It may end up requiring a wholesale shift in our economic system over the next century or two, but this is a challenge that I believe can be met incrementally and gradually.

Once we settle on a society with a market economy and recognize the need for a government to manage some parts of that economy,as well as to maintain a free and open society, the next question is about the kind of government that you want. Here the question seems to be around balancing efficiency, which we have established as key, with accountability and the need to preserve fundamental freedom and openness.

Although there certainly seems to be some evidence, including the experience of modern China, to suggest that authoritarian systems have a slight efficiency advantage, there are serious problems with preventing the abuse of power in those systems, because of the lack of accountability. Most authoritarian systems have difficulty maintaining a free society for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, democracy has its own problems. Some democratic systems are vulnerable to paralysis and inaction, either because of checks and balances in the system or because the system promotes highly fragmented coalition governments. Additionally, democracy sometimes has issues with making hard decisions, ones that might be unpopular but necessary.

As much as I have to admit that the Platonic "philosopher kings" might superficially appeal to me, I have to judge that given that since I believe freedom and openness must be the cornerstone of a society, an authoritarian government is too dangerous to accept. We simply cannot take the risk, and must therefore accept democracy as the best, and only choice. Additionally, as I have pointed out in the past, democracies generally have less civil war, genocide, political repression and other internal conflicts, and rarely fight wars against each other, all of which will help achieve my ultimate goals.

However, that does not mean we cannot attempt to at least minimize democracy's problems. The efficiency problem is a small one, especially when democracy is combined with capitalism. The main steps than can be taken to improve efficiency have to do with regulatory regimes and tax policy. In many cases, efficiency can be improved by simply trying to minimize regulation itself. I believe that in many cases there is far too much government regulation. Where regulation is required, it should be geared towards maximizing efficiency, through doing things like funding hospitals based on services provided and choosing cap & trade systems over flat taxes when trying to minimize carbon emissions. This desire for efficiency is also a contributor to my view on taxation.

The problem of systematic paralysis is more difficult, but seems to have been mostly surmounted in many democratic systems. Here I believe Canada has it at least partially right, in that the executive branch of a democracy needs to be relatively powerful. Gridlock can also be prevented through a multiparty system (ideally 3-5 parties) or even better, doing away with political parties altogether. Canada's system does have some weaknesses, which I have outlined in previous posts, but they generally do not relate to the gridlock issue.

Another problem Canada has managed to avoid is the lack of stability caused by extremely fragmented democracies, which also tend towards the extremes because of the tendency for the balance of power to be held by smaller, fringe parties. This has come at a cost of fairness in some respects, but I have already discussed those issues.

I think that that begins to cover the links between my basic philosophical views and the core of my political beliefs. Most of my other political beliefs drive off of the basis of the key goals at the beginning of the post, and off the subsequent analysis. Specifically, many beliefs come from a perceived necessity for efficiency, nonzero-sumness and tolerance. I will briefly elaborate, but try and keep it short as this post is getting towards the long side.

My views on efficiency inform many of my political beliefs. My views on free trade, agricultural subsidies, the necessity of global regulation, the desirability of a meritocracy (which leads to other policies around equality of opportunity) and other issues, are driven by my belief that we require both an efficient, and increasingly nonzero-sum society.

Another key factor that drives my political views is tolerance. I view a free and tolerant society as non-negotiable, which drives much of my social policy views. My views on regulation also affect my social views; government has no place legislating who can or cannot get married, for example.

There are some views that do not fall clearly within this framework, notably my views on health care and the environment. I believe that these views simply spring from the obvious point that humanity cannot explore the galaxy, drive science to new heights, and ensure our survival as a species if people are not getting quality health care, or if the environment is uninhabitable. There is also something to be said for preserving the diversity of life, for the sake of human knowledge and experience. I think this is why issues of conservation are probably the most important parts of environmental policy for me.

I believe I have accomplished an important task in the last few posts. I believe I have developed a reasonably solid and consistent philosophical foundation for my beliefs, which should help me significantly when I confront future issues and decisions. I am satisfied.

Four Point Five

As luck would have it, less than two days after I posted part four, I got into a fierce discussion with Trent about the nature of morality. I realized that my previous post was inadequate with respect to certain issues. Trent also convinced me of the necessity of modifying my position somewhat. So, part 5 will have to wait, as I attempt to address a few key issues on my ethical philosophy.

Firstly, I must reemphasize that I believe that this moral rationale applies only in the case of a purposeless universe. I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to be certain (or even fairly confident) whether or not humanity/life has an underlying purpose driving its existence, and I therefore believe it is prudent to give consideration to either eventuality. In fact, as I have previously stated, my beliefs lean slightly toward a purposeful existence of one kind or another.

The second thing I must address is my own ignorance. As I have little practical training in philosophy, I have come to realize that some of the terminology I have been using is inaccurate or incomplete from a philosophical standpoint. For example, I use the term "moral relativism" in a broader sense than the specific usage in modern philosophy. When I discuss "moral relativism" I simply mean a rejection of the metaphysical thesis (the truth of a moral statement is based on objective moral facts,which are mind-independent just like non-moral facts) but an affirmation of the semantic thesis (moral statements express propositions) and acceptance of the aletic thesis (some moral propositions are in some way true). I do not mean "cultural relativism".

The other place where I feel I have been ignorant is on the distinctions between the different branches of ethics, as defined in modern philosophy. I believe my previous post can be confusing because it does not distinguish between my meta-ethical position and my normative position.

Based on what I have read, my meta-ethical position is certainly cognitivist, but likely anti-realist. From what I have read, I believe it is a form of what wikipedia calls "Individualist Ethical Subjectivism". Basically this is a fancy way of saying what I noted in my last post, which is that each individual has a unique moral framework, based on their genetics and experiences. All of these individual views are equally valid and equally "right", with two exceptions:

1. The individual's moral framework is not internally consistent or not rational. Any valid individual morality must be reasonably consistent and rational. I understand that the vast majority of people (including me) have not examined their own beliefs closely enough to be sure that no inconsistencies exist, but I believe a person who has a very well-thought-out framework can safely say that their moral framework is more valid than someone whose morality is riddled with inconsistency. I admit there is a subjective dividing line here.

2. The moral framework is based on an incorrect understanding of mind-independent facts. This, I believe, is where moral progress comes from. I believe the moral framework of the average person today can be said to be more valid than that of a person from the past simply because we have greater general knowledge. Human sacrifice, for example, was born out of an incorrect knowledge of nature. The Aztecs genuinely thought that human sacrifice was fundamental to ensuring the survival of their society, and thus moral. We now know that to be an empirical falsehood; many societies have been very successful without human sacrifice. I therefore think that we have some justification to say that our morality is more "right" than theirs. I also think that it is very likely that future humans, with a better understanding of the universe, will have some justification in claiming to be morally superior to us.

As for my normative position, I think the closest philosophical position to mine is something called Preference Utilitarianism, which basically says the moral action is the one that leads to the greatest "good," where "good" is defined as the satisfaction of each person's (presumably each stakeholder's) individual preferences or desires. This is close to what I talk about in my previous post, with a couple important differences. It seems that a situation could arise where someone could do something contrary to their own preferences or desires, because they consider it moral.

For example, take the case of stealing. I would imagine there are cases where stealing would greatly satisfy the "preferences and desires" of the thief, and would not substantially damage the "preferences and desires" of any other stakeholder. Under Preference Utilitarianism, it would seem like the moral action would be to steal the item. However, in my normative view, that stealing is unlikely to be morally non-zero sum (unless both the thief and the victim consider stealing to be morally acceptable) and would certainly violate the freely established moral consensus of Canada, where stealing is held to be wrong in most cases.

The second difference is the inclusion of non-zero sumness itself. I believe that win-wins are inherently better than win-lose scenarios. Consider the difference between two choices in a moral dilemma with two stakeholders. In Choice A, the outcome is morally satisfactory to both stakeholders, but results in a net change in "preferences or desires" of say, 10 on a hypothetical numeric scale. In Choice B, the individual morality of one stakeholder is satisfied, but that of the other is not (the action is immoral to them). However, this scenario results in a net change of 20 on our hypothetical scale. The Preference Utilitarian and I would come to different conclusions.

Having (hopefully) fleshed out some of my ideas and been more clear about the philosophical positions I hold, I'd like to end with my answers or thoughts about some of the specific questions that came up in my debate with Trent. I don't pretend that there won't be inconsistiencies, and I certainly don't have all the answers. However, I feel obligated to do my best.

1. Moral Wikiality

There is something troubling about morality set by consensus. What about a society consisting entirely of child abusers? If the freely established moral consensus is that this is acceptable, does that make it right in the context of that society? How does this reconcile with observed feelings that that would be wrong in any scenario?

Here I think the answer comes from our good friend evolution. Basically, my argument for why Moral Wikiality is not a big problem is also the key distinction between my meta-ethical view and what is commonly referred to as cultural relativism. This is my belief that our individual moral frameworks have a genetic component. Individuals with strong negative feelings toward certain actions would find it much easier to survive and reproduce as a member of a social species. Humans with a strong aversion to murdering each other would certainly be able to work together more effectivley, and increase their survival rate.

Once humans developed agriculture and started forming larger-scale societies that frequently interacted with each other, further reinforcement of "moral universals" came from society as well as from genetics. Societal "evolution" began to reinforce cooperative behaviour, as societies that had greater cooperation, greater non-zero sumness, began to conquer and replace weaker neighbouring societies. Cultures that conditioned their children against dysfunctional behaviour like incest, child abuse and irrational violence survived, and those behaviours were strongly reinforced.

So, I believe that both genetics and cultural development have endowed humans with strong, and basically universal, opposition to certain behaviours. The society of child abusers and the society of murderers could never exist. Even societies with slaves are quickly fading, as they are outcompeted by those societies with more efficient economic frameworks.

One note, is that I do not believe that this combination of genetic and societal selection will eventually result in one perfect "universal" morality. There are plenty of moral issues that do not have a clear effect on the survival of individuals or societies. Take for example euthenasia. It is here that the most contentious issues will be found, and this is where different societies will have different approaches that must be respected.

2. What constitutes a moral action?

In a society governed by the rules I have set out in part four, how does someone know what constitutes a moral action? If the society is not free, or otherwise not representative of the true moral consensus, what guides people's actions? Is any action that conforms to the consensus & one's personal morality moral? What about the instance where people are mistaken about the consensus?

The short answer is that you never know for certain what the moral action is, you can only make your best guess. This is why freedom and strong moral discourse in a society are so key, because it improves the ability to make educated guesses. I have to think more on some of the specific scenarios above, especially in the case of people making the wrong guess. I think it is also important to reemphasize that the moral action is ideally the most non-zero sum outcome for all the stakeholders, and that the societal consensus acts (in the ideal society) as an approximation of the views of the average citizen, and as a constraining force.

Taking an action contrary to a false consensus in an unfree society is certainly not immoral in itself. Even taking action contrary to the consensus in a free society may be moral, in some cases.

3. Relations between societies

The layout of my position largely governs moral relations within a society. What about moral relations between societies? Does moral relativism imply non-interventionism? Do we have the right (or the obligation) to morally condemn actions taken in other societies that we see as immoral?

Easy answers here. My views do not imply non-interventionism at all. In fact, it may suggest the opposite in some cases.

We have the right to critique the morals of other societies, although this does not imply they are absolutely "wrong," in a mind-independent way. It simply adds to the moral discourse within both societies, and should be beneficial for that reason alone. One just must be careful to avoid "moral superiority" and fundamentalism. Both societies will benefit if they listen to what the other has to say.

4. Definition of a society

If we say that morality is based at least in part on the freely established consensus of a society, how do we define a society? Can it be argued that every society has sub-societies, and that it is therefore impossible to define the level at which a moral consensus might be established?

This argument has a point, but I think that it is logical to define a society as the broadest group that subscribes to the same "social contract" (basically the same laws and institutions). In the vast majority of cases this is the level of the state. I don't have a well-thought-through argument for why this should be the case, however.

5. Moral Progress

Are we justified in saying we are morally superior to older societies in which practices we find morally objectionable (like slavery or human sacrifice)? If so, how does this reconcile with a relativistic morality?

See Above.

6. Nature vs. Nurture and Moral Universals

Why are there certain moral rules that seem to be ubiquitous among almost all societies throughout history? Doesn't this provide evidence for moral universals?

See #1.

Hope that clears some things up. It has for me I think.

The Economist's Tale (4 of 5)

Say that we decide the assumptions of the prophet are erroneous, and instead decide to accept the opposing set of theories. We are then left with two choices:

1. A concurrent multiverse, encompassing a vast number of universes with different & random physical laws.

2. An underlying unity in physics that mandates the values of the parameters and physical laws that we observe.

These views suggest, in opposition to the others, that life, and consciousness, are simply an accident of the universe, generated in the same way as any of the other complex phenomena that we observe. There is no meaning to our existence, no purpose for us to fulfill, and little room for the existence of God.

If we accept that this is the case, then the next question logically becomes this: If we have no purpose to fulfill, how can we decide how to conduct our existence?

If we are committed to acting in a rational and consistent way, there are three schools of thought as to the actions people should take.

1. Consequentialism- People should act based on how the consequences of an act conform to some principle or goal

2. Deontology- People should act based on how the nature of the act itself conforms to some principle

3. Virtue Ethics- People should act based on how the action affects the actor in relation to some principle or goal, usually either fulfillment of potential or relevance to the actor's comparative advantages

Within each of these categories, there are many, many options. Take consequentialism, for example. Philosophers have struggled to identify a goal for consequentialists to pursue, or even a concise set of goals. Happiness, wealth, survival or power for oneself have all been suggested.

Also proposed have been a number of societal goals, rather than individual ones. For example, one might strive to maximize the happiness of society, rather than his own happiness.The question that provides the key to this whole mess, however, often gets lost in the shuffle. One should start by asking whether it is reasonable to assume that there is an overriding ethical principle or set of principles. Is it reasonable to assume there is a single, defined way that people should behave?

I would answer in the negative for the following reasons:

1. People have different ideas about what the ideal world looks like. I think that an ethical view necessarily implies a view of the ideal world. For example, a consequentialist that believes in maximization of personal happiness implies that he believes his ideal world to be one where he is always happy. In contrast, a collectivist virtue ethicist would implicitly have an ideal world where everyone reached their full potential. Since it is quite obvious that different people have different ideas about the ideal state of the world, I think it is unreasonable to assume that they should have the same ethical view.

2. There is no evidence to show there is any one set of universal moral standards. People often say that religion provides this universality, but any cursory examination of religion (especially Abrahamic religion) shows the "universal" moral code to either be treated extremely selectively according to the culture of the time period (as in mainstream Christianity) or be extremely deviant from mainstream beliefs (as in fundamentalist Christianity).

3. The fact that after at least 2500 years of scholarly debate, we are still no closer to any sort of consensus than we were in the days of Socrates, probably means that there is no universal morality to discover. Unlike the advancement of science (say development of a theory of quantum gravity), a universal moral code does not seem likely to emerge with more or better information, due to the nature of moral questions as opposed to scientific ones. On a practical note, even if such consensus were possible among philosophers, it would be next to impossible to get all people to adopt it as their personal moral code.

The questions that I anticipate people will ask of this line of reasoning are as follows: if there are no moral universals, how should we decide how to live our lives? How can we be sure that our laws are just? How can we incorporate billions of people, all with different moral standards, into a coherent and fair society?

Here I believe the answer is best illustrated through an analogy with economics. Just as everyone (I believe) has a distinct moral code, based on our genetics and experiences, individuals have a unique set of consumption preferences in economics. All of these individual consumption preferences (or utility curves, if you like) are aggregated together to form the demand side of economics. Just because my individual price preferences are different that someone else's doesn't mean we can't have a fair economic system that represents the consumption preferences of all people.

In the same way, I believe that a society defines its collective morals through the aggregation of the individual moral views of all the citizens. The vast majority of individual people have value systems that postulate random murder of innocent people as immoral, just as the vast majority of people in our society have consumption preferences where they would not pay $1000 for a grapefruit. Now, certainly there are people that might pay $5 for a grapefruit, and that influences the overall price of grapefruits in the economy. Other people might only pay 10 cents for a grapefruit, say if they happen not to like them. These divergent views do not suggest that the market price of a grapefruit in our society is in any way unfair, in fact (in a truly free market), it should be the fairest possible price given all relevant views.

Now take the subject of the morality of killing. There are people in our society who believe that all killing of living things is immoral, and attempt to do as little of it as possible. There are also people (serial killers and the like) who see no moral quandary in killing any life (human or otherwise) for their own pleasure. Most of us fall somewhere in the middle, where we might happily kill plants and insects, and don't necessarily mind the humane killing of lower animals either for food (like cows) or for other reasons (like rats), but we have profound doubts about the needless slaughter of higher animals like dolphins and apes, and we have to think long and hard on our views about any kind of human killing, even if there are complicating factors (see abortion, euthanasia, the death penalty and even self-defense).

Not only are people in our society spread across a wide spectrum when it comes to killing, but that spectrum has an even larger standard deviation if you look back through time. There were periods of history (many!) where the wholesale slaughter of other humans was largely accepted by the most advanced societies of the time.

We cannot be so presumptuous as to think that no person is ever morally justified to kill another, nor can we say that abortion is wrong in all circumstances, always has been, and will be forever (deontological views). We cannot even say that murdering one hundred innocent people to save a thousand is always right (a consequentialist view). We can only say that there are many differing opinions on many moral issues, and that we must try to have a society that is just and fair nonetheless. The only way I see to do this is to treat morality as a relative thing, and common morality as an aggregation of the individual morality of all the members of a society.

The question then remains, how does a person conduct themselves in order to make such a morally relative society as just and fair as possible? People take comfort in absolutes, and it is pleasant to many people to believe that if they just follow a few simple ethical rules, everything will work itself out. We have seen that there is no silver bullet in that sense, no absolute truths that if followed, will always result in a utopian outcome, but there are a few things that people can take to heart and even consider to be guiding principles in a morally relativistic world.

1. People need to try their best to accept and manage diverging views. In a morally relativistic society, one of the greatest dangers is fundamentalism of any kind. If people don't realize that different moral opinions may also be valid, that is the first step toward intolerance. Steadfast attempts to prove the moral superiority of one view, or attempts to force others to change their morals to match one's own, can only lead to conflict. All people, regardless of their moral views, should preach acceptance and understanding of the moral views of others, and respect for honest differences of opinion.

2. My second principle is related to the first, and must be considered in tandem with it. Realizing that everyone has a different set of moral views is good, but we must also realize that individuals' moral frameworks are constantly being "tweaked," and may even be significantly altered through experiences, discussions and debates. Discussion and debate on moral issues is also extremely critical for establishing and maintaining a just and fair moral consensus within a society, which I will refer to as a "moral zeitgeist".

Just as it is very difficult to establish a fair price for goods and services in a command economy or any other economy where there is insufficient consumer information, it is difficult if not impossible to have a truly just society when there is not sufficient freedom to allow the creation of a moral zeitgeist that is representative of the views of all members of the society.

Although I dislike the idea of having an exception to principle #1, I am forced to conclude that in the scenario where there is moral opposition to free and open discourse (and not just political and social opposition by the elite/men), we should nonetheless be obligated to intervene, and do all in our power to promote freedom of discourse (which encompasses freedom of speech, thought, religion, assembly and freedom of the press). I believe this is essentially analogous to the need for antitrust laws in a free economic system, that is, necessary to preserve the integrity of the system itself.

I must add a disclaimer here, because the preceding paragraph could be interpreted as condoning violent action toward any unfree state, and could also imply that I believe the absence of freedom is the only justifiable reason for international military action. Neither is true. To the first assertion, I would respond that military action is not the only way to influence the expansion of freedom in a society, and should in fact be a last resort (see my post The Altar of Freedom). On the latter question, I believe that the moral zeitgeist in a society can provide other justifiable reasons for military action (such as the strong beliefs against genocide in the zeitgeist of western nations). I am only saying that all free nations have a serious obligation to advance freedom around the world.

In those societies where that freedom does exist, the most fair moral zeitgeist will come when people are engaged and active in society. People should endeavour to discuss their moral views as much as possible, and seek out different views and perspectives in order to refine their own morality. Challenging the views of others and advocating one's own beliefs (in a way consistent with principle #1) should be encouraged, as the resulting debate will be inherently valuable to both parties as well as to the society.

3. The third thing that people need to consider in a morally relativistic world is that they have only partial control over the moral zeitgeist of their society, and that even if an individual view conflicts with that consensus, there must be an understanding that it is a consensus. Just as all people must pay the market price for goods, or live with the consequences of doing otherwise, those people who choose to act against the established morals of their society must face a different set of consequences. One of the attacks most often levelled against moral relativism is that we have no right to apply consequences in such a world. I strongly disagree, and believe that it essentially does not matter whether a given action is always wrong, if it is wrong according to the freely established consensus of a society, the perpetrator must live with the consequences of his/her violation.

4. The fourth and final principle I would advocate is similar to one I have previously advocated on an economic and social basis. I have previously argued in favour of Robert Wright's nonzero hypothesis, which argues that societies compete and evolve based on their level of nonzero-sum interactions. The most successful societies, he argues, are those that have the highest proportion of non-zero sum interaction.

I would take the same argument and apply it to systems of moral interaction. In a morally relativistic world, the most successful moral systems are going to be those that are morally nonzero-sum. What I mean by this is that people facing moral dilemmas in any society are often going to have a number of (personally) morally acceptable choices. Especially in situations where a moral dilemma involves others, the nonzero hypothesis would advocate taking into account not only one's own morality, but the morality of other stakeholders (or your best guesses about their morality, based on personal experience and knowledge of the prevailing zeitgeist). The best choice would be the one that satisfies your individual morality, and also creates the largest number of moral win-win scenarios.

How do we do this? How do we create tolerance and understanding, while at the same time vigorously promote debate and discussion? How do we decide what consequences are appropriate for those that do not accept the moral consensus? How do we promote nonzero-summness? The answers to the former questions lies in Wright's answer to the latter.

Wright shows in detail that increases in non-zero sum interaction are based on two things, communication and trust. I will leave that particular explanation in his capable hands, but I will expand it to cover my other proposals.In terms of promoting tolerance and understanding, both communication and trust are vitally important.

Improved communication allows people to discover far more information about other people who may be geographically or culturally different, and to obtain far more information about various moral theories and systems.

Trust helps people let down their guard and discover things that may be unfamiliar to them. Trust that other people are going to be reasonable and accepting of different views also promotes mutual understanding and exchange. Both communication and trust help people see others as "someone like me" rather than the proverbial "other", which is something Wright discusses extensively in his book.

The advantages of communication and trust in promoting open debate and enabling gradual changes to the moral zeitgeist are self evident and cannot be overstated. Establishing fair consequences and making sure everyone understands those conseqences is also vastly easier in a communicating, trusting, nonzero-sum world.

Now I believe we have established a pragmatic and intelligent ethical system in the case where humanity is an accident of the universe, the next question lies in reconciling it with the conclusions reached in the Prophet's Tale, and combining the two worldviews into a philosophical foundation from which to justify my empirical beliefs. That daunting task awaits in the final post of the series...

The Prophet's Tale (3 of 5)

Say we accept one of the following principles as valid:

1. A creator designed the universe in a way conducive to the emergence of life and/or intelligence
2. There is an underlying principle in physics/cosmology that limits the universe's properties to only those conducive to life and/or mind.

3. The existence of the universe requires an observer, and therefore only universes with a capacity for consciousness can exist.

These three arguments have in common one thing; they all presume a unique place for life in the universe. Other than that unifying idea, the three theories are fairly dissimilar.

However, I believe that it is not necessary to know for certain which of the three is true. The fact that they all agree life is unique is enough information for me to go on building my philosophical foundation.

If life holds such a central, unique place in our universe, it follows that life likely has some purpose. Whether this purpose is to follow or seek knowledge about a creator, or to sustain the existence of the universe through observation, or something else entirely, at this point it only matters that our existence does indeed have some meaning.

Once we accept that life has a purpose, I think we must also accept that we don't know what that purpose is. Here many people will disagree with me, but I simply have not seen any substantive evidence in any one direction. There is enough information, however, to draw two other conclusions:

1. Since we don't know what life's purpose is, we cannot be sure if it has already been fulfilled. I therefore think that we must work, as the most advanced life we know of, to ensure life's survival until that point that we discover our purpose has been fulfilled. Alternativeley, if our purpose turns out to require our continued existence, I believe we must attempt to prolong life until the end of the universe.

2. Since we cannot know if life has fulfilled its purpose (and cannot work to fulfill it if it remains unfulfilled) unless we know what it is, I believe that it is logical to adopt an "interim purpose" of searching for the overarching meaning of our existence. Since that meaning almost certainly has to do with either ourselves, the universe or a hypothetical creator of the universe, I would go so far as to adopt a more specific "interim purpose":

*Humanity, as the most complex life known, should strive to find the meaning of life's existence through the exploration, observation, analysis and experience of as much of the universe, and the life that exists within it, as possible*

So, if we accept a model of the universe that suggests an overarching meaning of life, I believe we must also accept that our two greatest goals should be the survival and propagation of life, and the acquisition of knowledge about the nature of life and the universe.

The White Tree (2 of 5)

If I am to construct a personal philosophy, I see no alternative but to start at the very beginning. Like Descartes, I am confident of my own existence. I am also confident that I appear to observe a coherent external universe. Starting from only those convictions, and the conviction that reason can create a true picture of existence, I see three possibilities.

1. The physical universe exists, roughly as I observe it.

2. Some external entity is deceiving me into believing the universe exists.

3. I am somehow unconsciously deceiving myself into believing the universe exists.

In either of the latter cases, I arrive at an impasse. I have no knowledge, and no capacity to obtain knowledge about either the deceiving entity or the mechanism of self-deception. If either of those options is the truth, it would be impossible to make rational decisions, because I have no information. I would have to either guess (randomly) something about the nature of the deception and act based on that, or assume nothing and act randomly.

However, if the first option is correct, I do have information on which to make decisions. Given a choice between acting randomly and acting on the basis on information which is possibly (but not necessarily) correct, I believe I have no alternative but to choose the lesser evil and accept the existence of the physical universe as I observe it.

Given the existence of the universe, one can begin to draw conclusions based on the available evidence. Some of the philosophically relevant conclusions I draw include the following:

1. The universe operates based on a set of unchanging rules. (like gravity)

2. The universe appears to be of finite age and size; it had a beginning, is expanding and will have an end.

3. The universe is such that it permits the formation of stars and planets, and hence life. It seems that this state depends on a relatively small range of values for physical constants.

The next logical question to ask is why these things are the case. Why does our universe have the rules it has? Why do the conditions we observe seem to be almost exactly right for life? In my research, I uncovered a list of possibilities that I feel is complete:

1. The Absurd Universe - Our universe just happens to be the way it is.

2. The Unique Universe - There is a deep underlying unity in physics which necessitates the universe being the way it is. Some Theory of Everything will explain why the various features of the Universe must have exactly the values that we see.

3. The Multiverse - Multiple universes exist, having all possible combinations of characteristics, and we inevitably find ourselves within a universe that allows us to exist.

4. Creationism - A creator designed the universe with the purpose of supporting complexity and the emergence of intelligence.

5. The Life Principle - There is an underlying principle that constrains the universe to evolve towards life and mind.

6. The Self-Explaining Universe - A closed explanatory or causal loop: "perhaps only universes with a capacity for consciousness can exist."

7. The Fake Universe - We live inside a virtual reality simulation.

I reject the first option on the grounds that is infinitely improbable. I also reject the seventh on the grounds that it does not explain anything; presumably if we exist in a virtual reality world, whoever or whatever created that world exists in some kind of universe of its own, which would require an explanation. The only way this could be possible is if the programmer is some kind of being whose existence is not caused or self-caused, in which case #7 becomes #4. This leaves options 2-6.

Work done by Stephen Hawking and others suggests that it is highly unlikely that our universe is part of an infinite consecutive chain of universes that have existed forever; among other things this would require our universe to end by collapsing down into a "Big Crunch", which has been shown to be a dubious theory. This means that if #3 is correct, the multiple universes must be concurrent, and must have all began at the same time. #3 also implies that the number of parallel universes must be exceedingly large if not infinite. Further, it implies that the multiverse have universes with many different variations of physical constants, unlike, say, the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, which (in most interpretations) postulates a large/infinite number of concurrent universes sharing the same physical properties.

So, now I arrive at a point of divergence. The specific version of hypothesis #3, as above, and hypothesis #2, suggest (on their own) a non-anthropocentric universe. In those views, life (and consciousness) is merely an accident of physics, much like many of the other strange phenomena observed in our universe. In stronger interpretations of this view, like those held by Trent and Taylor, consciousness makes no difference to human function, and is merely akin to "a computer observing another computer and analysing its actions". The stronger interpretations also hold that this kind of universe does not leave a place for any idea of God, and therefore strongly suggests God does not exist.

On the other hand, hypotheses 4-6 suggest that life, and by extension consciousness, hold a unique place in the universe. I believe that any of these interpretations also imply a purpose for consciousness, even if it is only to survive and observe the universe. These intrepretations also leave a place for God, as presumably a conscious creator provides one of the few answers as to why our universe might have a special place for life.

I tend to lean more towards the second set of theories for two reasons. First, I have a certain amount of sympathy for the argument from causation, that is, that everything that occurs has some cause, some answer to "Why/How did this occur". This is the basis for reason, and something I cannot reject. I believe causation to be the case for our universe and everything in it, as even random and probabalistic actions are subject to some degree of causation. However, if the universe has not existed forever (as we have previously discussed) then there must have been a "first cause", which was either uncaused or self caused. I believe this makes a "creator" of some kind more probable.

Secondly, in my opinion, the evidence suggests that life may have some unique place in the universe. I believe life displays properties that are distinct and far different than anything else in the universe (such as a tendency toward complexity), consciousness (which I don't think is just an illusion), and an ability to define new properties of the universe, like meaning, beauty or appreciation.

Still, I must concede I do not have sufficient evidence that either set of theories is correct or even very likely. I believe my analysis and observation is only sufficient to conclude that the second set is more probable. Therefore, I cannot base further beliefs on one strand or the other, but I must explore both in isolation. I believe they will lead to the same result in the end, but we will see in the next two posts.

The Problem is Choice (1 of 5)

Having written mostly in this blog about "proximate" issues and my opinions on them, I find myself compelled now to address "ultimate" issues and my beliefs in relation to them. I am essentially talking about philosophy, and I imagine I will find this topic quite difficult, as I have no formal training in the discipline aside from one undergraduate course.

Despite the difficulty I may have on this topic, I feel that exploring it is necessary. Taylor brought this necessity to my attention by noting the fundamental basis of all practical beliefs must spring from a philosophical underpinning if one wishes to be consistent, as I do. He pointed out, for example, that my entire economic worldview is based on the premise that people have some choice in the outcome of their lives. If merit is not a matter of choice, but rather something determined solely by genetics and environment, then it is nonsensical that one person is more deserving of anything than another.

Further, if a person's decisions are not truly free, it seems to follow that no one can have moral responsibility for anything. If a person's choice to commit a crime is not actually a choice, but a certainty based on genetics and environment (external factors), the whole notion of responsibility seems absurd.

I must clarify that when I speak of choice, or free will, in this post, I am not referring to the compatibilist definition of free will (one has free will whenever another person is not forcing him to undertake a certain action). I am speaking of truly free will, by which I mean that one can make a decision that is not entirely based on causes outside his control.

Unfortunately, as Taylor pointed out, the scant evidence that exists from psychology and neuroscience suggests that truly free decisions are an illusion, and all decisions are a product of genetics and external stimuli. Current physics suggests that even if the universe is not deterministic but probabilistic, (as quantum theory suggests) quantum mechanics does not necessarily provide a mechanism for free will. This is for two reasons:

1. Quantum effects are unlikely to affect events at the scale of neurons and cells, they generally only deviate from classical physics at the atomic level.

2. Even if, though quantum entanglement or some other process, brain function is random or probabilistic as opposed to deterministic, this does not automatically provide for free will. Consider a hypothetical choice, where someone must choose between Choice A and Choice B. Suppose that we had the ability to rewind time, so that the exact same decision would be made in the same circumstances by the same person 10 times. Consider the outcomes under four different assumptions about choice:

I. In a deterministic universe, the choice is determined by the person's genetics and environment. The person will make the same choice all 10 times. Given full knowledge of the universe, the outcome of this choice could be predicted from the beginning of time.

II. In a probabilistic universe, the outcome of the decision could be predicted based on conditions in a probabalistic way. Given full knowledge of the universe, one could say that there was an 80% chance of choice A and 20% chance of choice B (for example). However, the quantum effects are not beholden (as far as we know) to any external cause.

Given a choice between moving one hand or the other, we would expect the quantum probability to be roughly even (or say 60-40 in favour of the dominant hand). However, there is no physics that I've read about that suggests the quantum probabilities couldn't be .99-.01, even though this would seem absurd. I guess what I am saying here is that from what I understand, quantum-based decision-making is difficult to reconcile with rationality. However, I am not a physicist or a philosopher, and must leave open to consideration a model whereby true free will is created by a model of the universe that is deterministic at large scales and probabalistic at small scales (like ours), and where the cerebral decision-making apparatus is affected by both causes and quantum probabilities (or quantum probabilities are affected by causes).

III. A random universe is essentially a probabalistic universe where all choices are equally probable. This seems even more difficult to reconcile with observed rationality.

IV. A universe that is not a closed system would allow for free will. If sentient beings have a "soul" or some non-physical aspect that can influence physical reality, then there would be a source for "self-caused" effects to determine decisions. This solution, however, seems to conflict with lack of evidence for non-corporeal existence. It cannot, however, be entirely ruled out. It just seems less likely than the other solutions.

Free will is of course only one of many of the philosophical positions I will need to construct if I am to be sure that my practical beliefs have a solid an consistient underpinning. I will leave this post here, and in the next one I will start building from the ground up.