Thursday, May 14, 2009

The Problem is Choice (1 of 5)

Having written mostly in this blog about "proximate" issues and my opinions on them, I find myself compelled now to address "ultimate" issues and my beliefs in relation to them. I am essentially talking about philosophy, and I imagine I will find this topic quite difficult, as I have no formal training in the discipline aside from one undergraduate course.

Despite the difficulty I may have on this topic, I feel that exploring it is necessary. Taylor brought this necessity to my attention by noting the fundamental basis of all practical beliefs must spring from a philosophical underpinning if one wishes to be consistent, as I do. He pointed out, for example, that my entire economic worldview is based on the premise that people have some choice in the outcome of their lives. If merit is not a matter of choice, but rather something determined solely by genetics and environment, then it is nonsensical that one person is more deserving of anything than another.

Further, if a person's decisions are not truly free, it seems to follow that no one can have moral responsibility for anything. If a person's choice to commit a crime is not actually a choice, but a certainty based on genetics and environment (external factors), the whole notion of responsibility seems absurd.

I must clarify that when I speak of choice, or free will, in this post, I am not referring to the compatibilist definition of free will (one has free will whenever another person is not forcing him to undertake a certain action). I am speaking of truly free will, by which I mean that one can make a decision that is not entirely based on causes outside his control.

Unfortunately, as Taylor pointed out, the scant evidence that exists from psychology and neuroscience suggests that truly free decisions are an illusion, and all decisions are a product of genetics and external stimuli. Current physics suggests that even if the universe is not deterministic but probabilistic, (as quantum theory suggests) quantum mechanics does not necessarily provide a mechanism for free will. This is for two reasons:

1. Quantum effects are unlikely to affect events at the scale of neurons and cells, they generally only deviate from classical physics at the atomic level.

2. Even if, though quantum entanglement or some other process, brain function is random or probabilistic as opposed to deterministic, this does not automatically provide for free will. Consider a hypothetical choice, where someone must choose between Choice A and Choice B. Suppose that we had the ability to rewind time, so that the exact same decision would be made in the same circumstances by the same person 10 times. Consider the outcomes under four different assumptions about choice:

I. In a deterministic universe, the choice is determined by the person's genetics and environment. The person will make the same choice all 10 times. Given full knowledge of the universe, the outcome of this choice could be predicted from the beginning of time.

II. In a probabilistic universe, the outcome of the decision could be predicted based on conditions in a probabalistic way. Given full knowledge of the universe, one could say that there was an 80% chance of choice A and 20% chance of choice B (for example). However, the quantum effects are not beholden (as far as we know) to any external cause.

Given a choice between moving one hand or the other, we would expect the quantum probability to be roughly even (or say 60-40 in favour of the dominant hand). However, there is no physics that I've read about that suggests the quantum probabilities couldn't be .99-.01, even though this would seem absurd. I guess what I am saying here is that from what I understand, quantum-based decision-making is difficult to reconcile with rationality. However, I am not a physicist or a philosopher, and must leave open to consideration a model whereby true free will is created by a model of the universe that is deterministic at large scales and probabalistic at small scales (like ours), and where the cerebral decision-making apparatus is affected by both causes and quantum probabilities (or quantum probabilities are affected by causes).

III. A random universe is essentially a probabalistic universe where all choices are equally probable. This seems even more difficult to reconcile with observed rationality.

IV. A universe that is not a closed system would allow for free will. If sentient beings have a "soul" or some non-physical aspect that can influence physical reality, then there would be a source for "self-caused" effects to determine decisions. This solution, however, seems to conflict with lack of evidence for non-corporeal existence. It cannot, however, be entirely ruled out. It just seems less likely than the other solutions.

Free will is of course only one of many of the philosophical positions I will need to construct if I am to be sure that my practical beliefs have a solid an consistient underpinning. I will leave this post here, and in the next one I will start building from the ground up.

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